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CHAPTER 2 
Comparative Negligence 
JAMES W. SMITH 
§2.1. Introduction. For over 100 years the law of Massachusetts 
has been that, where the plaintiff's own negligence contributed as an 
efficient cause of his injury, he is totally barred from recovery even 
though the defendant was also guilty of negligence which contributed 
proximately to the result.1 Chapter 761 of the Acts of 1969 abolishes 
this rule and establishes in Massachusetts the doctrine of comparative 
negligence. 
Chapter 761, which becomes effective on January 1, 1971, and applies 
only to causes of action arising on or after that date, amends Chapter 
231 of the General Laws by striking out Section 85 and inserting in 
place thereof the following: 
§85. Contributory Negligence No Bar to Recovery of Damages; 
Findings of Fact or SPecial Verdict; Reduction of Damages by 
Court. Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any 
action by any person or legal representative to recover damages 
for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or prop-
erty, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the 
person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed 
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributable to the person for whose injury, damage or death 
recovery is made. 
In any such action the court, in a nonjury trial, shall make 
findings of fact or, in a jury trial, the jury shall return a special 
verdict, which shall state: 
(1) the amount of the damages which would have been recover-
able if there had been no contributory negligence; and 
"(2) the degree of negligence of each party, expressed as' a per-
centage. 
Upon such findings of fact or the return of such a special 
verdict by the jury, the court shall reduce the amount of the 
damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable 
to the person for whose injury, damage or death recovery is made; 
provided, however, that if said proportion is equal to or greater 
than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, 
JAMES W. SHrm is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
§2.1. 1 Brown v. Kendall. 60 Mass. 292 (1850). 
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then, in such event, the court shall enter judgment for the defen-
dant. 
The basic operation of the Massa.chusetts comparative negligence 
statute is not particularly complex. In a jury trial, the jury returns 
a special verdict stating the amount of the damages which would have 
been recoverable had there been no contributory negligence, and the 
degree of negligence of each party expressed as a percentage. In a 
nonjury trial these findings are made by the judge. If the percentage 
of negligence attributable to the plaintiff equals or exceeds that 
percentage attributable to the defendant, the court entets judgment 
for the de£endant.2 If the plaintiff's percentage of negligence is less 
than the defendant's percentage, the court reduces the plaintiff's 
damages in proportion' to the amount of negligence attributable to 
him. The proportionate' reduction is based upon the ratio that the 
plaintiff's negligence bell1'5 to the combined negligence of plaintiff and 
defendant (usually 100 percent) and not the ratio that the plaintiff's 
negligence bears to the defendant's.B Thus, if the plaintiff was found 
20 percent negligent and the defendant 80 percent negligent, the 
plaintiff's recovery would be reduced by 20 percent (20/100) and not 
by 25 percent (20/80). 
A. PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE STATUTE 
§2.2. Special verdict. The requirement that the jury return a 
special verdict has two purposes. One is . based upon a fear that a jury, 
if allowed to render a' general verdict, may not reduce the plaintiff's 
damages as instructed. While it is tt:Ue that a jury today may ignore 
contributory negligence or compror¢se its verdict, the overall danger 
of a sympathetic jury ignoring the instructions of the trial judge 
2 The operation of this part of the statute leads to the apparently illogical result 
that, if the plaintiff is 45 percent negligent, he recovers 55 percent of his damages; 
whereas, if he is 50 percent negli~nt, he recovers nothing. While this limitation has 
been criticized as "too much shot through with the noxious and stultifying contrib-
utory negligence notion" (see 82 A.T .I..J. 741, 768, 1968), it does seem that there 
oUght to be a point where the plaintiff'i own negligence so substantially contributes 
to his injury that reCovery should be denied, particularly with respect to damages 
for intangibles, i.e., pain and suffering. 
Similar limitations exist in Arkansas (Ark. Stat. Ann. §27-1780 (1962»; Maine 
(Me. Rev. Stat. ,Ann. tit. 14 §156 (Supp. 1965»; and Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. §895-045 
(1968). Mississippi on the other hand has a so-Called "pure" comparative negligence 
statute. (Misi. Code Ann. §1454 (1956». 
New. Hampshire recently enac1led, a mmparative negligence statute which has a 
slight variat,ion on .this percentage test. N.H. Rev_ Stat. Ann. §507:7a (1969). The 
New Hampshire statute allow. ,the plain~iff a partial recovery "if his negligence was 
not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant ••• ," Thus, whereas in 
Massachusetts a finding of '50 percent negligence on the part of the plaintiff would 
bar recovery, in New Hampshire, a finding of 51 percent negligence on the plain-
tiff's part would be necessary to. bar' recovery. The difference is purely academic. 
S See Cameron v. Union Automobile Ins. Co., 210 Wis. 659, 246 N.W. 420 (1988), 
rehearing denied, 210 Wis. 668, 247 N.W. 455 (1985). 
2
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1969 [1969], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1969/iss1/5
§2.2 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 49 
is greater with the comparative negligence rule than with the contrib-
utory negligence rule. One effect of the comparative negligence doctrine 
is that cases which might otherwise have terminated in a directed 
verdict for the defendant1 must be sent to the jury for an apportion-
ment of damages. The special verdict requirement affords some pro-
tection to the insurance companies that juries, operating' under the 
comparative' negligence rule, will not ignore or greatly minimize the 
plaintiff's own negligence. Another reason for the special verdict is that 
without it, the trial judge could not, in many instances, determine 
whether the damages awarded are inadequate or excessive. 
Under G.L., c. 231, §127, the court may, at any time before judg-
ment, set aside the verdict in a civil action and order a new trial. 
Inadequacy or excessiveness of the damages awarded constitute grounds 
for a new trial.2 Before a verdict is set aside on these grounds, the trial 
judge should attempt to have the excessiveness or inadequacy of the 
damages corrected by the appropriate use of the remittitur or additur.s 
The amount of the plaintiff's negligence obviously has no logical 
bearing on the ascertainment of his damageS'. The reduction of damages 
due to plaintiff's contributory negligence is more in -the nature of a 
penalty. Thus, were the jury permitted to reach a general verdict, the 
court would have no way of knowing whether a small amount of 
damages reached by the jury was attributable to a finding of contrib-
utory negligence to a substantial degree or a misunderstanding of the 
instructions given on the damages issues. Likewise, a large verdict 
might actually be excessive, if· there were a substantial amount .of con-
tributory negligence found, but proper if the jury found little contrib-
utory negligence or none at all. 
Suppose, for example, in the trial of a personal injury case in which 
some evidence of contributory negligence has been presented, the jury 
renders a general verdict of $9000. Considering the nature of the 
plaintiff's injuries the amount seems inadequate. The plaintiff moves 
for a new trial. It would be extremely difficult for the court to rule on 
the motion without knowing the basis for the jury's finding of damages 
in this amount.' The jury might have found that the plaintiff was not 
§2.2. 1 While the present G.L., c. 2111, §85, creates a presumption of due care on 
the part of the plaintiff, and while it is seldom that the defendant is entitled to a 
directed verdict based upon oral testimony of the plaintiff's contributory negligence 
(Charity v. Yates, 1968 Mass. Adv. Sh. 711, 2117 N.E.2d 11), where it is obvious that 
the plaintiff was not exercising the care of a reasonably prudent man, a directed 
verdict may properly be ordered for the defendant. Loyle v. Boston Elevated Ry., 
260 Mass. 404,157 N.E. 1156 (1927). 
It is, of course, theoretically possible for the defendant to receive a directed verdict 
even under the comparative negligence statute. Thus the court could rule that as a 
matter of law the plaintiff contributed proximately to his own injury and as a 
matter of law the plaintiff's negligence was equal to or exceeded the defendant's. 
While such cases are rare, they may occur. See Pyykonen v. Mutual Service Casualty 
Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 1151, 11511 (7th Cir. 1958). 
2 G.L., c 2111, §128. 
SId. §127 . 
• The court could request orally answers to special questions concerning the jury's 
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guilty of contributory negligence and that his actual damages were 
$9000; or it might have found that the plaintiff was 40 percent re-
sponsible for his injuries and that his actual damages were $15,000. 
In the latter set of findings, the damages may not be inadequate and 
the motion should be denied; whereas in the former set of findings, 
the motion should perhaps be granted unless the defendant agrees to 
the addition of such amount as the court finds reasonable. The use 
of the special verdict obviates this difficulty. 
§2.~. Amount of negligence. The language of the Massachusetts 
comparative negligence statute which is most vulnerable to questions 
of statutory construction is that which has reference to the diminution 
of the plaintiff's damages in proportion to the amount of his negli-
gence. Does the word "amount" refer to the extent of the plaintiff'S 
deviation from the standard of reasonableness in terms of the risks 
which his conduct was creating immediately prior to the accident 
(moral fault), to the extent to which the plaintiff's negligence con-
tributed. to the accident which actually occurred (legal fault or 
proximate cause), or to a combination of both elements. 
Assume a situation where the defendant has failed to check and 
replace a very bald tire on his automobile. As a result of such failure, 
he has a blowout while driving on a major highway. He loses control 
of the automobile, crosses the center strip and strikes the plaintiff's 
automobile coming in the opposite direction. The plaintiff is highly 
intoxicated, driving at an excessive speed and weaving from lane to 
lane. Assume the facts would reasonably create an inference that, had 
the plaintiff been exercising ordinary care, he could have avoided 
the harm. Assume, further, that the jury finds that both the plaintiff 
and the defendant were negligent and the negligence of each contrib-
uted proximately to the plaintiff's injuries. In determining the 
"amount" of the plaintiff's negligence, if the jury focuses its attention 
solely on which party is more morally blameworthy, in the sense of 
which conduct was creating the greater risk of harm just prior to the 
accident, the likelihood is that it will conclude that the plaintiff's 
negligence was at least equal to, or perhaps even greater than the 
defendant's. Such a finding under the statute would result in a judg-
ment for the defendant. If the jury, on the other hand, is instructed 
that in determip.ing the "amount" of the plaintiff's negligence it 
should consider only the extent to which the plaintiff's conduct con-
tributed to his injury, it might well find that the "amount" of the 
plaintiff's negligence was less than the defendant's. After all, the 
,plaintiff was struck on his side of a divided highway by the defendant's 
automobile which went out of control due to the defendant's negli-
finding on contributory negligence and damages provided that it did so before the 
verdict was recorded. Under Massachusetts Jaw the court may request orally answers 
to special questions after the jury has returned a general verdict. See G.L., c. 251. 
§124: Newell v. Rosenberg. 275 Mass. 455, 459. 176 N.E. 616, 618 (1951). The court 
may not do 10 after the verdict has been recorded. Patterson v. Barnes, 517 Mass. 
721, 724-725, 60 N.E.2d 82, 84·85. 
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gence. The plaintiff's negligence only operated to prevent the plaintiff 
from getting out of the way. 
It is this writer's view that the correct theoretical answer to the 
problem posed is that only legal fault should be apportioned by the 
jury in arriving at damages. This conclusion is bome out by the 
language of the statute. It states that "[c]ontributory negligence shall 
not bar recovery ... if such negligence was not as great as the negli-
gence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages 
allowed shall be diminished ~n proportion to the amount of negli-
gence . .•. " (Emphasis added.) The word "such" appears to incorporate 
the elements of contributory negligence, and it is unlikely that the 
word "negligence" as used in subsequent parts of the statute refers to 
anything different. Under existing law, negligence of the plaintiff, no 
matter how culpable he may be in the sense of creating risks to others, 
even to the defendant, will not operate as a bar to recovery unless it 
created an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff himself.1 This 
legal fault concept of contributory negligence appears to have been 
incorporated by reference into the comparative negligence statute, 
even to the extent of the jury's determination of the "amount" of the 
plaintiff'S negligence. 
Irrespective of this conclusion, it is likewise this writer's view that 
no instruction should be given to the jury limiting its determination 
of the "amount" of the plaintiff's negligence to the question of com-
parative degrees of efficient cause. Two reasons prompt this conclusion, 
the first of which is simplicity. The perfect conceptual solution to a 
problem is useless unless it can be fairly understood and applied by 
a jury. The concept of proximate cause, particularly as it relates to the 
issue of the existence of contributory negligence, is itself sufficiently 
complex. To require the jury then to go further and determine degrees 
of proximate cause, discounting culpability in the moral sense, is 
unrealistic. 
Secondly, the comparative negligence doctrine is merely an attempt 
to mitigate the harshness of the present rule that contributory negli-
gence is a complete defense. It represents sort of a compromise between 
our present system and a completely no-fault system of recovery. As 
such, it is not unfair to a plaintiff if a jury gives some consideration 
to the moral culpability of his conduct in ~ssessing damages. After 
all, before the jury ever reaches the question of comparative negligence, 
it has already determined that both the plaintiff and the defendant 
acted unreasonably and that the conduct of each contributed prox-
imately to the plaintiff's injury.1I Beyond that, the jury should simply 
§2.S. 1 O'Connor v. Hickey, 268 Mass. 454, 167 N.E. 746 (1929). 
II It seems reasonably clear that the comparative negligence statute makes no 
change in the rule that the plaintiff's own negligence has no effect on his recovery 
unless it operates as an efficient or proximate cause of the injury. Most states which 
have adopted a comparative negligence doctrine have been faced with the question 
of the effect, if any, of such doctrine on the "last clear chance" rule. The consensus 
appears to be that, if the last clear chance doctrine is in actuality only the applica· 
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be told to detetm:ine the degree of negligence of each party expressed 
as a percentage without any instruction being given as to efficient 
cause.· 
. §2.4. Wrongf~ death. Under existing law, a person shall be 
liable if his negligence causes the death of a person "in the exercise of 
due care.Pl · Since the Massachusetts comparative negligence statute 
applies not only to actions for injury to person or -property but also 
to death actions, this law will be changed on the effective ,date of the 
statute. 
In other states which have adopted comparative negligence, the 
application of the doctrine in a death action is quite similar to its 
application in art 'injury case. The damages are determined on a com-
pensation theory and are then diminished in proportion to the amount 
of the decedent's negligence. In Massachusetts, however, damages in 
tion of the proximate cause principle in the area of contributory negligence, com-
parative negligence should have no effect on the doctrine. If, however, "last clear 
mante" is merely an attempt to mitigate the harshness of contributory negligence 
as a CQIIlplete d~fense, $en the purpose of the last dear chance rule is no longer 
viable with the adoption of a comparative negligence doctrine. The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine recently took this latter view. Cushman v. Perkins, - Me. -, 
245 A.2d 846 (1968)., (For a discussion of the Maine comparative negligence statute, 
see 18 Maine L. Rev. 65 (1966». Massachusetts has never purported to adopt the 
doctrine of last dear ch'ance. In those cases whi!=b presented classic last clear chance 
situations, the Supreme Judicial Court examined the problem in terms of whether 
the plaintiff's negligence was a caus/lof the injury or merely created a condition 
which was acted upon by the defendant causing the plaintiff's injury. See Black 
v. New York, New Raven &: Hartford R.R., 198 Mass. 448, 97 N.E. 797 (1907); Wall 
v. King, 280 Mas,. 577, 182 N.E. 855 (1932). Since these decisi~ns speak in terms of 
proximate caUlle, it is unlikely that they. will be affect,ed by the: comparative neg-
ligence statute. 
S An analogous problem involves minor plaintiffs. A minor's age is relevant on the 
question of whether or not he deviated from the standard of ordinary care. Brooks 
v. Glidden, 329 Mass. 704, 110 N.E.2d 495 (1953). Whether it is also relevant in the 
jury's determination pf the amount of the minor's negligence under the comparative 
negligence statute depends upon the. resolution of the matter discussed above. In a 
case 'involving a minor plaintiff, Kohler v. Dumke, 18 Wis .. 2d 211, 216, 108 N.W.2d 
581; 584 (1961), the SuptemeCouit of WiscOnsin took the view that in comparing 
the negligence of two or more persons under the Wisconsin comparative negligence 
statute, the jury is to consider both the element of negligence and the element of 
causation, and no .attempt should be made to lay down any formula for determining 
how much weight is ~obe accorded the element of negligence and how much to that 
of causation. A view 'had been expressed in the dissenting opinion of an earlier 
Wisconsin case, Hanson v. Binder,260 Wu. 464, 468, 50 N.W.2d 676, 679 (1952), that 
"[O),nce it has'been found that each [party] has violated his duty and is guilty of 
causal negligenc:e, the ,element of age and experience drops' out of the case, and then 
there is only the matter of determining whose act (already found to be a negligent 
one) contributed most to the result. In. other words, the comparison is to be made 
of the extent to which the actor failure of the respective parties contributed to 
produce' the accident, not of their respective dUties as they may be affected by 
their age, experience, or condition:' . 
. ii' 1 
§2.4 •. ,1 G.L,· c. 229, §2. Presumably the language of this statute will have to be 
amended to refiect· the change which will be brobgllt about by the comparative 
negligence statute. 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1969 [1969], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1969/iss1/5
§2.4 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 53 
a death action are based upon the degree of culpability of the defen-
dant's conduct.2 Applying the comparative negligence statute in Massa-
chusetts in a death action will presumably require the jury to assess 
the quality or quantity of the defendant"s negligence twice - once to 
determine what damages would have been recoverable had the dece-
dent not negligently contributed to his own death, and then to provide 
the degrees of negligence of each party, expressed as a percentage. The 
application of comparative negligence to actions brought under the 
Massachusetts death statute is somewhat confusing if not unwieldy. 
Were it not for the special verdict requirement, the likelihood is that 
most juries would simply take the $50,000 maximum recovery and 
split it according to the relative degrees of fault. Even with the special 
verdict, the likelihood is that juries will assess the defendant's culpa-
bility at a higher figure than is presently the case,lI feeling justified 
on the basis that this will then be reduced by the extent of the 
decedent's culpability. 
It is this writer's view that a comparative negligence statute cannot 
logically be applied to a punitive statute. As a matter of fact, the 
present absolute defense of the decedent's contributory negligence 
makes no sense when applied to a punitive statute. If the statute is 
quasi-criminal, the imposition of a punishment should not depend 
upon whether the decedent negligently contributed to his own death. 
Likewise, the extent of the punishment should not depend upon 
comparative degrees of negligence of the defendant and the decedent. 
This point was made by the Supreme Judicial Court in an opinion 
dealing with the nonjoinder of defendants in a death action: "Log-
ically, as in the criminal law, each wrongdoer may be made to suffer 
the maximum penalty, no matter how many are guilty.'" The fact 
that with contributory negligence or comparative negligence we are 
dealing with the conduct of the decedent rather than another defen-
dant should make no difference. The death action is not an action 
belonging to the decedent or his estate. It is a penalty for his death. 
It is a cause of action over which the deceased has no control. Thus, 
for example, a release executed by the decedent prior to his death does 
not constitute a bar to a subsequent wrongful death action.1I 
Another matter for consideration in the application of the Massa-
chusetts comparative negligence statute in a death action involves the 
effect of the negligence of one or more of the statutory 1?eneficiaries. 
Under existing law, damages cannot be denied or reduced because of 
the contributory negligence of one or more out of it group of bene-
ficiaries .• Since the Massachusetts comparative negligence statute in a 
I Ibid. 
8 Under existing law the jury may assess the maximum amount allowable under 
the statute even though the defendant's conduct was not wilful and wanton. Toczko 
v. Armentano, lI41 Mass. 474, 170 N.E.2d 701l (1960). 
~ Arnold v. Jacobs, 1I16 Mass. 81, 84,54 N.E2d 922, 9211 (1944). 
II Wall v. Massachusetts Northeastern Street Ry., 229 Mass. 506, 118 N.E. 864 (1918). 
eO'Connor v. Benson Coal Co., 1I10 Mass. 145, 16 N.E2d 6116 (1938). . . 
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death action has reference only to a diminution of damages ". • • in 
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person for 
whose •.. death recovery is made • • . ," the statute should have no 
effect on this rule. In other words, the comparative negligence statute 
relates to the n~ligence of the decedent and not to any negligence of 
one or more of the statutory beneficiaries. 
§2.5. Joint tort-feason. The comparative negligence statute poses 
several problems of statutory interpretation when applied to joint 
tort-feason. Assume, for example, that the plaintiff sues two defen-
dants, Dl and D2 jointly, claiming that their separate· acts of negli-
gence combined to cause his injuries. The jury finds that P suffered 
$50,000 damages and that P .was 25 percent negligent, Dl was 25 per-
cent negligent, and D2 was 50 percent negligent. Should judgment be 
entered for Dl on the basis that P's negligence and the negligence of 
Dl are equal and, if so, what amount should .be deducted from the 
$50,000? In the language of the statute ". • • if said proportion [the 
plaintiff's negligence] is equal to or greater than the negligence of the 
person against whom recovery is sought, then, in such event, the court 
shall enter judgment for the defendant .•.• " ThiS' would seem clearly 
to indicate that judgment should be entered for D1• To interpret the 
word "person" as meaning persons when joint tort-feason are involved 
would not appear to be within either the letter or spirit of the statute. 
Assuming that judgment is entered for Dl on· the above reasoning. 
will P recover $20,000 ($50,000 minus $10,000 (25/75 X $80,000» or 
$22,500 ($50,000 minUS' $7500 (25/100 X $50,000». In other words, 
when judgment is entered for D1, is P's negligence then compared 
with the total remaining negligence (75 percent) or is D2, in effect, 
required to pick. up the negligence of Dl? The answer to this question 
is not contained explicitly in the. statute. The relevant portion of the 
statute states that "the court shall reduce the amount of damages in 
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the penon for 
whose injury, damage or death recovery is made ...• " It thus provides 
us with the numerator but not the denominator of the fraction. It is 
this writer's view that the plaintiff's damages should be reduced on 
the basis of the ratio that the plaintiff's negligence bears to the com-
bined negligence of the plaintiff and those defendants against whom 
liability has been established, 25/75 in our hypothetical. This view, it 
is SUbmitted, is consistent with the spirit of the <;amparative negligence 
statute, which is simply to relieve plaintiffs from the harshness of the 
doctrine that colltriputory negligence is a complete defense. It is doubt-
ful that the legislature, by choosing language reducing the damages 
by the amount of the plaintiff's negligence (as opposed to reaching the 
the same result by allowing damages to the extent of defendant's 
negligence), intended to hold D2 responsible for the negligence of Dl 
in the above hypothetical.l 
12.5. 1 An eppoeite result WIll reached by the Supreme Court of Wilconafn, prin-
dpaUy upon the cheic:e of 1aosuap uaed by the lqUlature that the "dam ... 
8
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The results suggested above should in no way be changed where P, 
rather than suing Dl and D2 jointly, sues only D2 who thereafter im· 
pleads Dl as a third party defendant2 for the purpose of determining 
his right, if any, to contribution from Dl. As third party defendant, D1 
should be entitled to establish that his negligence Wa$ no greater than 
P's negligence, and therefore, as to P that he was not a joint tortfeasor 
liable in contribution to D2.8 In this instance, even though D2 loses 
any right to contribution from Dt, he nevertheless benefits by having 
impleaded Dt. By impleading Dt, D2 forces a fact-finding on the 
amount of Dt's negligence which, even if less than P's negligence, 
will benefit D2 by lessening P's recovery. In other words, by impleading 
Dl, D2 requires the fact-finder to make findings on the percentages 
of negligence of P, Dt, D2 in the same fashion as if P had originally 
joined Dj and D2. Again assuming percentages of negligence of 25, 
25 and 50 percent for 'P, D1 and D2 respectively, it can be seen, by 
way of illustration, that the effect of D2's impleader of D1 is to die 
minish P's recovery from 75/100 of the total damages to 50/75 of those 
damages, i.e., from % to %. resulting in a benefit to D2 of 1/12 of the 
total recovery. 
B. SUGGESTIONS IN RELATED AREAS 
§2.6. Assumption of the risk. One of the most anomalous doc-
trines of tort law is the defense of assumption of the risk. In essence, 
it denies recovery to a plaintiff who voluntarily exposes himself to a 
known and appreciated risk.1 While the application of the doctrine 
has in many cases rendered "unnecessary an analysis which might 
determine whether the ultimate ground of denial of recovery is ab-
sence of duty or breach of duty, want of proximate causal relation, 
or contributory negligence,"2 it does operate as a defense indepen. 
dently of contributory negligence.8 Thus, a plaintiff may be denied 
recovery despite the fact that he acted with due care .• The doctrine 
is not a just one. If the defendant has not breached a duty to the 
allowed shall be diminished by the jury in the propoltion to the amoUDt of negli-
gence attributable to the person recovering." See Walker v. K.roger Grocery Ie Baking 
Co., 214 Wis. 519, 5114, 252 N.W. 721, 727 (19114). 
:,) See GoL, c. 2111, §fB. 
8 See G.L, c. 2111B, §I(a). With exceptions not here applicable, contribution UD-
der this statute is dependent upon the establishment of joint liability. Where 
Dl's negligence is equal to or less than P'., such joint liability does not exist. 
§2.6. 1 Pouliot v. Black, 1141 Mass. 5111, 170 N.E.2d 709 (1960) (caddy injured 
"shagging" golf balls denied recovery on basis of assumption of risk). 
2 Hietala v. Boston Ie Albany R.R., 295 Mass. 186, 190·191,11 N.E.2d 1177,1180 (19l16). 
, 8 Miner v. Connecticut River R.R., 1511 Mass. 1198, 26 N.E. 994 (1891) • 
• Where the defendant by his negligence has placed the plaintiff or a third part)' 
in imminent peril, he cannot defend on the basis of assumption of risk when the 
plaintiff uses reasonable means under the circumstances to protect himself or where 
the plaintiff in a reasonable manner, goes to the rescue of the third peraon. Edprtoa 
v. H. P. Welch Co., 1121 Mass. 6011, 74 N.E.2d 674 (1947). 
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plaintHf . thep, . !obviously there should be no recovery on that basis. 
1£, on the.othetrhand; the defendant has breached a duty to the plain, 
tiff, .the·remaining question in determining whether liability exists 
should relate to the due care exercised by the plaintiff for his own 
safety. In otheI' words, the question should not be whether the plain. 
tiff voluntarily exposed himself to a known .and appreciated risk but 
rather whether such· exposure was, under the circumstances, a reason-
able act.lIe. 
The ,Jack of ,logic or justice inherent in the assumption of risk doc-
trine iscompbunded by the comparative negligence statute. Since 
the statute speaks in. terms only of contributory negligence, it is quite 
possible that the statute will have no application if it is found that 
the plaintiff had assumed the risk. It would be absurd to hold that, 
if the plamtift'.s assumption of risk was unreasonable, then the asSump-
tion of risk defense maybe :ignored and the comparative negligence 
statute applied to the unreasonable aspect of his conduct, whereas, 
if his assumption of risk was reasonable under the circumstances, 
then it will operate as a complete defense. Likewise, it would appear 
unjust to completely deny recovery to the plaintiff where his conduct 
involves an assumption of risk, whether reasonable or unreasonable, 
and allow a partialreco\.'ery to. a plaintiff .who has been guilty of con-
tributory negligence. Either the assumption of risk defense should 
be abolished' br the comparative negligence statute amended to handle 
this problem.s , " . 
§2.7:Be1'lefits 'from 'collateral sources. Often an injured plaintiff 
wilt, as a result of hiS injUries, receive certain benefits from sources 
other than thedefendatlt or 'the defendant's insurer. There are basi-
cany,thre~'types of benefit!J ~hich a plaintiff may receive from such 
~ collateral source: (l)a"continuation of wages during the period of 
disability; (2) proceeds from health and ,accident insurance policies 
and (3). services rendere,c!l gratuitously. In most instances in Massachu-
setts, the defendant is not' entitled to a reduction of damages because 
the plaintiff has received'~ collateral benefit. 
Ii A,ssu~ •. ~or ex~ple.that tilt: plaintiff slips on a sheet of ice on the stairway of 
the d~fendant·$S~ore. Tpis,CQn~tion was knowp to the defendant. The plaintiff saw 
the ice and appreciated the danger involved in walking on it. It is. in my opinion. 
fallacious to claim that the storeowner breached no duty to the plaintiff once the 
plaintiff s~w the ice. The main issut1 should be. whe~er the plaintiff. acted negli-
ge?~y: in. ~ftemptin& ,to wilJlc. on the .ce. This should depelld upon his reason for 
gomj1;into the s~orei If pe.i8 entering the only drug store in town to purchase a 
drug for a sick child. he is probably acting reasonably. If he is going into the store 
to. I;l,uy ac~y b~J;. ~e ,result ~ould be different. 
S In a 1962 Wi~consin decision. McConville v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. 
c;q .. ~15 Wis.,2d~74,)13 N.W.2d 14. the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the 
guest in an autqmpbil.e who- stays in the automobile in the face of a known hazard 
is no lopger s\-Ibject, ~ the dt:fensa of assumption of risk. If the guest's exposure 
q£ him~lf is uqJeasollable, udconstitutes a failure to exercise ordinary care for his 
own saf,::ty,. ~s ,C:QJllj.uct. is negligent, and is subject .to the comparative nt:gligence 
statute. 
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Wages received by the plaintiff during his disability, whether re" 
ceived as a matter of right under his employment contract or as a 
gratuity from his employer, are not deducted ·from the damages re-
coverable for impairment of earning capacity.1 This result is based 
upon the rather tenuous distinction (at least as far as past damages 
are concerned) between recovery of wages· as such and . recovery for 
impairment of earning capacity. Since recovery in Massachusetts is 
for impairment of earning capacity and not for wages 'as such,2 re~ 
covery may be had for impairment of earning capacity despite the 
fact that the plaintiff lost no wages. 
With respect to receipt of proceeds from health and accident insur-
ance policies, Massachusetts follows the rule of most states that the 
defendant is not entitled to benefit from the fact that the plaintiff 
has a health and accident insurance policy. Thus, despite the fact that 
it will result in a windfall to the plaintiff, the defendant is not en-
titled to have the proceeds received by the plaintiff from hisinsuran~ 
company deducted from the damages.s 
While the cases are far from clear on the matter, they appear to 
indicate that the plaintiff may recover for services rendered in con-
nection with his injury, if he could have been legally boUnd to pay 
for them.4 
While none of the Massachusetts cases appears to emphasize the 
matter, one of the principal reasons given in other states for. allowing 
a plaintiff to recover reimbursed expenses from the defendant is the 
punitive element of tort law - that it is preferable. that the so-called 
innocent party obtain a windfall than the wrongdoer benefit from a 
collateral source. This rationale would no longer appear viable where 
the plaintiff recovers under a comparative negligence statute. It is the 
opinion of this writer that, for example, a plaintiff whQ has negli. 
gently contributed to his own injury should not recover medical ex-
penses which were in fact paid by an insurance company; nor should 
he recover for impairment of earning capacity without diminution 
of wages received; nor should he recover the value of services which 
in fact were gratuitously rendered. 
§2.8. Contribution among joint tort-feasors. Chapter 23lB of the 
General Laws provides for contribution among joint tort~feasors. 
Section 2 of this Chapter specifically provides that, in determining 
the pro rata shares of the tort-feasors in the entire liability, the relative 
degrees of fault of the defendants shall riot be considered. It is clear 
that the Massachusetts comparative negligence statute has no effect 
§2.7. 1 Shea v. Rettie, 287 Mass. 454,192 N.E. 44 (19M). 
2 Doherty v. Ruiz, 1102 Mass. 145, 18 N.E.2d 542 (19119). 
S Gray v. Boston Elevated Ry., 215 Mass. 1411, 146, 102 N.E. 71, 72 (19111). 
4 See Daniels v. Celeste, 1l01l Mass. 148, 21 N.E.2d 1 (19119), distinguishing Copi. 
thorne v. Hardy, 1711 Mass. 400, 511 N.E. 915 (1899). See, however, Sibley v. Nason, 
196 Mass. 125, 81 N.E. 887 (1907), which appears to imply that a moral obligation 
would be sufficient. 
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on this provision. The comparative negligence statute compares de-
grees of negligence between the plaintiff and the defendant or defen-
dants, not between the defendants as such.1 
The adoption of the comparative negligence statute should even-
tually cause reconsideration of the pro rata concept in the contribution 
statute. Of course, any change in the contribution statute which would 
make the amounts of contribution dependent upon degrees of negli-
gence should in no way affect the plaintiff's right to collect the full 
amount of the judgment from anyone or more joint tort-feasors. It 
would merely affect the ultimate adjustment among the tort-feasors 
themselves.2 
C. CONCLUSION 
§2.9. Probable effects of the statute. It is not likely that the com-
parative negligence statute will substantially increase, in the aggregate, 
awards to injured plaintiffs. In some cases, it will merely legitimatize 
what juries have for many years been doing - compromising verdicts 
in a not too flagrant manner. In other instances, by eliminating the 
all or nothing approach, the comparative negligence statutes may 
actually reduce the amount of plaintiff awards. Further, the adoption 
of comparative negligence will certainly result in more cases being 
settled out of court. 
Finally, apart from eliminating the complete defense effect of con-
tributory negligence, the comparative negligence statute is not likely 
to affect other aspects of the law which have developed in the area 
of contributory negligence. One possible exception to this statement 
relates to the striking of the present G.L., c. 281, §85. Under the pre-
sent Section 85, the plaintiff enjoys the presumption of due care, and 
the burden of proof on the issue of the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence rests with the defendant. Prior to the adoption of the prede-
§2.8. 1 Thus, for example, if, in an action against joint defendants the jury found 
the plaintiff free from contributory negligence, it would have no reason to determine 
the degrees of negligence of each defendant. If it found the plaintiff was guilty of 
eontributory negligence, it would find the degree of negligence of each party to 
determine whether the negligence of the plaintiff was not as great as the negligence 
of the person against whom reCovery was sought. See §2.5 supra. 
21n the 1962 Wi8conain decision, Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 
105, the Supreme Court of WiscoJUin took the occasion to re-examine the doctrine of 
contribution between joint tort-feasor. and held that contribution should be propor-
tionate to percentage of causal negligence. In Wisconsin, contribution was jUdicial 
in origin and could thus be changed judicially. Change in Massachusetts would 
require an act of the legislature. 
In its holding in the Bielski decision the Court stated: "It is difficult to justify, 
either on a layman" senae of justice or on natural justice, why a joint tortfeasor 
whc.> ~ 5% causally negligent should only recover 50% of the amount pai,d to the 
plamuff £rem a c:e-tortfeasor who is 95% causally negligent, and conversely why 
the defendant who i. found 5% causally negligent should be required to pay 50% 
of the lou by way of reimbursement to the co-tortfeaaor who is 95% negligent." 
ld. at 6. 114 N.W.2d at 109. 
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cessor of the present Section 85,1 the plaintiff had the burde~ Ci)f proof 
on the issue of his own due care.2 
Chapter 761 of the Acts of 1969, which contains the comparative 
negligence provisions, strikes out the present Section 85. In so doing, 
some confusion may be created as to whether the plaintiffs presump-
tion of due care still exists and whether the defendant still initially 
has the burden of proof on the issue of the plaintiff's contributory 
negligence. The likelihood is that the courts will hold that, while the 
new Section 85 says nothing about burden of proof on contributory 
negligence, the es~nce of a comparative negligence statute calls upon 
each of the parties to prove the other's negligence. This is probably 
the correct interpretation of the statute. On the other hand, it may 
reasonably be argued that, since the comparative negligence provi-
sions only operate when the jury has found the plaintiff guilty of 
contributory negligence, they have no logical effect on the question 
of which party initially has the burden of proof on the issue of the 
plaintiffs own negligence or due care, and thus they do not fill the 
void on this issue, created by the striking of the present Section 85. 
§2.9. 1 Stat. 1914, c. 555. . 
2 Duggan v. Bay State Street Ry., 250 Mass. 570, 575,119 N.E. 757,758 (1918). 
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